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   The	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐2008	  basically	  reflected	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
One	  can	  imagine	  (contrary	  to	  fact)	  that	  every	  participant	  within	  this	  complex,	  global	  system	  was	  
behaving	  “rationally,”	  that	  is,	  looking	  after	  his/her	  own	  narrow	  interests	  within	  the	  existing	  legal	  and	  
regulatory	  framework,	  and	  that	  the	  regulators	  were	  all	  doing	  their	  jobs	  responsibly	  from	  their	  
perspective,	  and	  the	  system	  would	  nonetheless	  have	  failed.	  	  Of	  course,	  in	  reality	  there	  were	  knowing	  
miscreants	  and	  regulators	  who	  were	  not	  performing	  well,	  indeed	  who	  objected	  to	  some	  of	  the	  
regulations	  they	  were	  enjoined	  to	  enforce;	  but	  these	  people	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  system	  to	  collapse.	  	  Nor	  
was	  it	  simply	  bad	  luck,	  an	  adverse	  external	  event	  (such	  as	  an	  earthquake	  or	  a	  sun-­‐induced	  power	  
outage)	  that	  can	  sometimes	  bring	  down	  a	  system	  that	  is	  not	  robust	  to	  such	  shocks.	  	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  
internal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system	  itself	  that	  brought	  it	  to	  a	  state	  of	  collapse.	  
	   Any	  system	  of	  financial	  regulation,	  by	  placing	  limits	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  regulated	  institutions	  
(such	  as	  deposit-­‐taking	  banks)	  ipso	  facto	  creates	  financial	  incentives	  to	  arbitrage	  around	  the	  regulations.	  	  
Astute	  lawyers	  will	  seek	  and	  generally	  find	  novel	  arrangements	  that	  formally	  conform	  to	  the	  regulations	  
but	  engage	  in	  activities	  that	  the	  regulations	  were	  designed	  to	  discourage.	  	  Over	  time,	  new	  institutional	  
arrangements	  will	  be	  found	  to	  by-­‐pass	  the	  regulatory	  obstacles	  that	  have	  been	  imposed	  on	  the	  banks,	  to	  
stay	  with	  that	  example.	  	  Initially	  this	  arbitrage	  will	  be	  small	  and	  non-­‐threatening	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  
whole,	  even	  to	  the	  regulated	  institutions;	  but	  unless	  checked	  it	  will	  build	  over	  time	  to	  a	  point	  at	  which	  it	  
becomes	  quantitatively	  important,	  threatening	  to	  the	  regulated	  institutions,	  and	  even	  threatening	  to	  
the	  entire	  system.	  	  The	  regulated	  institutions	  will	  plead	  for	  relief	  from	  the	  regulations,	  permitting	  them	  
to	  participate	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  the	  arbitrage.	  	  Astute	  and	  prescient	  regulators	  will	  extend	  the	  
regulations	  to	  cover	  these	  innovative	  activities	  before	  they	  reach	  this	  point.	  	  But	  it	  takes	  enormous	  
political	  courage	  to	  stop	  the	  party	  just	  when	  everything	  seems	  to	  be	  going	  well.	  	  The	  mood	  of	  euphoria	  
is	  hard	  to	  resist.	  	  So	  periodic	  financial	  crises	  are	  an	  inevitable	  characteristic	  of	  a	  dynamic,	  ever-­‐changing	  
innovative	  economy.	  	  	  
	   Many	  features	  of	  the	  US	  financial	  system	  played	  their	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  crisis,	  but	  most	  
circle	  back	  to	  the	  high	  financial	  rewards	  associated	  with	  transactions	  and	  with	  short-­‐term	  performance.	  	  
Investment	  bankers,	  their	  lawyers	  and	  law	  firms,	  rating	  agencies,	  accountants	  insisting	  on	  pro-­‐cyclical	  
accounting	  rules,	  hedge	  funds,	  mutual	  funds	  –	  all	  played	  their	  roles.	  	  Each	  pursued	  its	  narrow	  interests	  
within	  the	  existing	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  framework,	  taking	  for	  granted	  the	  continued	  smooth	  functioning	  
of	  that	  system.	  	  None	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  concretely	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  leverage	  
and	  to	  the	  mismatch	  of	  maturities	  that	  the	  system	  was	  encouraging,	  financing	  bond	  purchases	  or	  
mortgage	  portfolios	  with	  short-­‐term	  funds	  –	  a	  practice	  that	  presumed	  the	  mortgages	  could	  quickly	  and	  
smoothly	  be	  packaged	  into	  marketable	  bonds,	  and	  that	  the	  bonds	  would	  remain	  liquid	  through	  well-­‐
functioning	  secondary	  markets.	  
	   The	  development	  of	  a	  global	  capital	  market,	  implying	  that	  excess	  savings	  in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  
world	  could	  be	  readily	  invested	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world,	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  lowering	  long-­‐term	  interest	  
rates	  throughout	  the	  world,	  which	  simultaneously	  lowered	  the	  cost	  of	  long-­‐term	  borrowing,	  especially	  
of	  30-­‐year	  mortgages	  to	  buy	  homes,	  and	  encouraged	  financial	  entities	  accustomed	  to	  higher	  returns	  to	  
reach	  for	  yield,	  both	  through	  greater	  leverage	  and	  through	  taking	  on	  more	  risk.	  	  The	  former	  effect	  in	  
turn	  increased	  the	  demand	  for	  housing	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (and	  many	  other	  countries,	  such	  as	  Britain,	  
Spain,	  and	  Ireland),	  which	  raised	  the	  prices	  of	  existing	  properties	  and	  stimulated	  new	  home	  
construction,	  which	  in	  mid-­‐decade	  reached	  levels	  (over	  2	  million	  new	  homes	  per	  year	  in	  the	  United	  
States)	  well	  in	  excess	  of	  those	  justified	  by	  new	  household	  formation,	  normal	  geographic	  mobility,	  and	  
destruction	  of	  existing	  housing.	  	  Ever	  rising	  home	  prices	  led	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  mortgage	  underwriting	  
standards,	  as	  collateral	  with	  continually	  rising	  prices	  could	  justify	  larger	  loans	  with	  less	  income	  security.	  	  
Securitization	  of	  mortgages	  increased	  access	  to	  funds	  for	  home	  purchases,	  by	  seeming	  to	  make	  
mortgages	  liquid	  and	  drawing	  in	  pools	  of	  capital	  that	  were	  not	  historically	  invested	  in	  mortgages.	  
	   All	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Interest	  rates	  on	  30-­‐year	  mortgages	  declined	  from	  
over	  8	  percent	  in	  2000	  to	  under	  6	  percent	  by	  2003,	  resulting	  in	  a	  drop	  in	  monthly	  payments	  of	  more	  
than	  25	  percent.	  	  The	  average	  price	  of	  existing	  homes	  rose	  steadily	  by	  more	  than	  48	  percent	  from	  2000	  
to	  2005.	  	  New	  single-­‐family	  home	  construction	  starts	  rose	  from	  1.6	  million	  in	  2000	  to	  over	  2	  million	  in	  
2005	  (only	  to	  fall	  below	  600,000	  by	  2009).	  	  More	  and	  more	  people	  were	  able	  to	  get	  mortgage	  loans,	  
such	  that	  home-­‐ownership	  rose	  from	  67	  percent	  of	  families	  in	  2000	  to	  over	  69	  percent	  of	  families	  by	  
2005.	  	  The	  resulting	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages	  were	  packaged	  into	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  (MBSs),	  
which	  along	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  credit	  were	  repackaged	  into	  Collateralized	  Debt	  Obligations	  (CDOs),	  
some	  of	  which	  were	  further	  repackaged	  into	  CDO-­‐squared.	  
	   When	  housing	  prices	  stopped	  rising	  and	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  rose	  on	  adjustable	  rate	  
mortgages,	  some	  homeowners	  were	  unable	  to	  make	  their	  payments	  or	  re-­‐finance	  their	  mortgages,	  
some	  securities	  came	  under	  a	  cloud,	  valuation	  became	  difficult,	  secondary	  markets	  ceased	  to	  function	  
smoothly,	  short-­‐term	  lenders	  developed	  doubts	  about	  the	  viability	  of	  their	  creditors	  and	  ceased	  to	  roll	  
over	  debt,	  many	  otherwise	  liquid	  securities	  became	  highly	  illiquid,	  and	  their	  owners	  became	  
questionable	  as	  counter-­‐parties	  in	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  normal	  transactions.	  	  Parts	  of	  the	  financial	  
market	  froze	  up.	  
	   None	  of	  this	  had	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  global	  imbalances,	  beyond	  their	  role	  in	  lowering	  long-­‐term	  
interest	  rates	  –	  a	  condition	  which,	  by	  the	  way,	  many	  economists	  over	  the	  years	  have	  considered	  highly	  
desirable,	  on	  the	  grounds	  it	  would	  stimulate	  productive	  investment	  and	  thus	  economic	  growth.	  	  Many	  
analysts	  forecast	  that	  global	  imbalances	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  We	  indeed	  had	  a	  crisis,	  but	  it	  
was	  not	  the	  crisis	  they	  foresaw,	  which	  would	  have	  entailed	  a	  massive	  outflow	  of	  foreign	  funds	  from	  the	  
United	  States	  –	  or,	  more	  mildly,	  a	  significant	  cessation	  of	  inflows	  –	  followed	  by	  a	  sharp	  depreciation	  of	  
the	  dollar	  and	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  US	  interest	  rates	  to	  try	  to	  stem	  the	  outflow	  and	  stabilize	  the	  dollar.	  	  In	  
this	  crisis,	  interest	  rates	  on	  US	  government	  securities	  declined	  to	  unprecedented	  lows	  and	  the	  dollar	  
appreciated	  during	  its	  most	  acute	  phase.	  
	   Some	  have	  blamed	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  for	  holding	  the	  federal	  funds	  rate	  too	  low	  following	  the	  
high-­‐tech	  bust	  of	  2001-­‐2002.	  	  That	  criticism	  may	  have	  some	  merit,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  principal	  
explanation	  for	  the	  subsequent	  financial	  crisis.	  	  The	  Fed	  began	  to	  raise	  rates	  in	  July	  2004	  (stock	  prices	  –	  
DJ	  and	  S&P	  –	  reached	  their	  nadir	  in	  February	  of	  2004).	  	  But	  long-­‐term	  rates	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  
short-­‐term	  rates	  –	  what	  Fed	  Chairman	  Alan	  Greenspan	  dubbed	  at	  the	  time	  a	  “conundrum,”	  although	  it	  
should	  not	  have	  been	  a	  surprise	  to	  anyone	  aware	  of	  the	  increasing	  globalization	  of	  capital	  markets.	  	  
	   It	  is	  true,	  as	  many	  have	  since	  complained,	  that	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  mechanisms	  US	  policy	  has	  
been	  to	  encourage	  home	  ownership	  by	  Americans,	  including	  notably	  the	  deductability	  from	  taxable	  
income	  of	  interest	  payments	  on	  mortgages	  and	  public	  support	  for	  the	  mortgage	  market	  through	  several	  
government-­‐chartered	  institutions.	  	  But	  these	  policies	  had	  been	  around	  for	  decades	  without	  causing	  a	  
financial	  crisis;	  they	  were	  part	  of	  the	  US	  financial	  system,	  but	  not	  a	  new	  part.	  	  	  
	   As	  home	  prices	  began	  to	  rise	  persistently,	  and	  as	  mortgage	  underwriting	  standards	  began	  to	  
deteriorate,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  could	  have	  intervened	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  requiring	  all	  member	  banks	  to	  
insist	  on	  minimum	  down	  payments	  on	  home	  purchases	  of,	  say	  15	  or	  20	  percent	  (as	  China	  did	  in	  2007	  
when	  it	  wanted	  to	  dampen	  the	  housing	  boom	  there).	  	  But	  such	  an	  action	  would	  have	  stimulated	  
arbitrage	  by	  encouraging	  financial	  institutions	  other	  than	  banks	  to	  originate	  mortgages,	  although	  that	  
would	  have	  taken	  time	  and	  some	  dampening	  of	  home	  construction	  might	  have	  been	  achieved.	  	  But	  of	  
course	  it	  would	  have	  evoked	  huge	  political	  outcry	  from	  Congress,	  Republicans	  as	  well	  as	  Democrats.	  
	   I	  note	  therefore	  that	  periodic	  financial	  crises	  are	  actually	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  policy	  and	  
especially	  political	  attention	  on	  the	  need	  to	  adapt	  and	  extend	  financial	  regulation	  to	  cover	  the	  
quantitatively	  significant	  arbitrage	  around	  the	  regulations	  that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  last	  significant	  
revision.	  	  Indeed	  the	  United	  States	  has	  had	  roughly	  a	  financial	  crisis	  a	  decade.	  	  Tweaking	  the	  regulations	  
is	  sometimes	  not	  enough,	  and	  radical	  change	  is	  impossible	  in	  boom	  times	  in	  view	  of	  the	  many	  vested	  
interests	  that	  develop	  during	  the	  boom.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  crisis	  of	  2008	  was	  necessary,	  but	  
unfortunately	  it	  did	  huge	  damage	  to	  the	  real	  economy,	  worldwide.	  	  The	  policy	  challenge	  of	  the	  future	  is	  
to	  recognize	  and	  act	  on	  financial	  crises	  early	  enough	  to	  forestall	  serious	  recession.	  
	  
